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Abstract: Multinational corporations increasingly seek to gain access to, and exploit, 
locationally specific sources of advanced knowledge and technological capabilities, creating 
a need to explain 1) the diversity amongst these facilities and 2) how institutions influence 
MNCs’ abilities to invest in different subsidiary types. Extending debates on firms’ 
knowledge-augmenting activities, we integrate institutions into our analytical framework to a 
greater extent than previous work has done. Moreover, existing contributions provide 
typologies of R&D subsidiaries. In contrast, we focus on a particular subset of subsidiaries, 
knowledge-augmenting ones, and put forward a theory to explain their variety and their 
prevalence, enabling us to identify previously neglected subsidiary types that have important 
managerial and policy implications. By downplaying the diversity of these subsidiaries, 
existing work has not been able to capture the full range of managerial challenges as well as 
the costs and benefits of different subsidiary types to host countries. We, therefore, 
problematize firms’ abilities to gain access to foreign knowledge-generating assets, highlight 
the importance of institutional environments, provide policy recommendations and identify 
areas for future research. 
Keywords: knowledge; internationalization of R&D; subsidiary embeddedness; institutions; 
comparative capitalisms 
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Introduction 
Companies’ desire to gain access to, and exploit, superior sources of knowledge generation, 
including research centres and talented individuals, that are unavailable elsewhere 
increasingly drives the establishment of knowledge-production facilities abroad (Chiva, 
Ghauri, & Alegre, 2014; Kristensen, 2016). Existing typologies of these subsidiaries usually 
encompass facilities that exploit as well as those that augment the MNC’s current R&D 
knowledge (Kuemmerle, 1999a, 1999b; Manolopoulos, Söderquist, & Pearce, 2011). 
Consequently, there is a need to distinguish further between, and to explain, the increasing 
number and types of knowledge-augmenting subsidiary. We develop a theory to explain the 
diversity and prevalence of this group of subsidiaries.  
Building on Kuemmerle (1999a), we define knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries as 
firms’ investments abroad to access and develop unique or rare knowledge-generating 
resources that are locationally specific and that can provide technical and/or research-related 
knowledge that is new to the firm and is likely to be tacit in nature. Although the subsidiary 
may combine local resources with existing knowledge from other parts of the company, such 
subsidiaries do not primarily exploit existing firm capabilities.  
To make these distinctions, we use the concepts of internal (company) and external 
(local) embeddedness (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; Heidenreich, 2012). Drawing on 
Andersson and Forsgren’s (2000: 339) work that defines and operationalizes the concept of 
‘technological embeddedness’, we refer to a subsidiary’s internal knowledge-augmenting 
embeddedness as the interdependencies and mutual adjustments that the overseas subsidiary 
and its network within the wider MNC make to create and develop the subsidiary’s 
knowledge resources. Similarly, a subsidiary’s external knowledge-augmenting 
embeddedness reflects how mutually adaptive the subsidiary and its network of local actors 
are to enhance the subsidiary’s technical and research-related knowledge.  
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We argue that internal and external embeddedness are independent from one another: 
a subsidiary’s level of internal embeddedness does not determine its level of external 
embeddedness. Consequently, we put forward a novel typology of knowledge-augmenting 
subsidiaries that captures a greater range of subsidiaries and highlights the important 
differences between them more clearly than existing work does. Our first contribution is, 
therefore, to capture the variety of knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries that exist. 
Previous typologies tend to assume that knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries can 
readily gain access to key knowledge either directly or via spillovers (Kuemmerle, 1999b; 
Manolopoulos et al., 2011). However, increasing competition from emerging-market MNCs 
and the role that governments in various locations often play in creating sources of advanced 
knowledge generation within their borders have made foreign companies’ access to them 
increasingly difficult (Sauvant, 2009; U.S. Department of State, 2015). Our second 
contribution is, hence, to show how institutions influence the availability of knowledge-
augmenting resources and, thereby, to problematize foreign firms’ abilities to acquire or 
generate knowledge in host countries. 
The existing literature tends to assume that institutions act as an incentive structure 
that is external to firms and that drives MNC behaviour (Belderbos, Leten, & Suzuki, 2013); 
this downplays how institutions both constitute and regulating firm behaviour. Drawing on 
the comparative capitalisms literature (Brewster, Wood, & Goergen, 2015; Kristensen, 2016), 
we demonstrate how institutions 1) influence firms’ variable natures and 2) moderate the 
relationships between different collective actors, including firms’ abilities to share authority 
with, and gain the commitment of, those subsidiary employees who are directly involved in 
knowledge-augmenting activities and who could be researchers, designers, engineers as well 
as manual workers if they contribute skills and expertise that is difficult to find in other 
locations. Our third contribution, therefore, is to show how institutional systems shape firms’ 
4 
 
abilities 1) to establish different types of knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries and 2) to 
manage the different levels and forms of subsidiary embeddedness associated with each 
subsidiary type (Hughes, Powell, Chung, & Mellahi, n.d.; Morgan, Kelly, Sharpe, & Whitley, 
2003).  
Whilst the innovation systems literature has provided rich taxonomies and studies of 
the interactions between different institutions, knowledge bases, technological regimes, 
channels of knowledge diffusion, organizational forms and industry sectors to explain 
developments in innovation patterns and the location of distinct knowledge-generating 
activities (Asheim & Coenen, 2005; Dosi, 1993; Lundvall, 2007; Malerba, 2002), our 
understanding of the institutional conditions that are necessary to support different firms’ 
investments in varying institutional systems to advance their knowledge remains limited 
(Allen, 2013).  
By examining how institutions shape firms’ investments overseas to establish and 
develop knowledge-augmenting capabilities, we note MNCs’ capitalist nature. On the one 
hand, this means that firms attempt to generate and exploit knowledge that is likely to be 
profitable, leading to a focus on some forms of knowledge and not others, and highlighting 
the systemic influences on capitalistic firms’ (in)ability to create different types of 
knowledge. On the other hand, the variable nature of capitalist systems means that firms from 
any particular institutional regime will, compared to companies from contrasting institutional 
settings, 1) have higher or lower pressures on them to develop knowledge-augmenting 
capabilities abroad (Witt & Lewin, 2007) and 2) be able to do so to different degrees 
(Whitley, 2012).  
We focus, then, on how institutions shape MNCs’ abilities to invest in different 
location-specific forms of knowledge. We do not seek to examine how different knowledge 
and industry characteristics (Asheim & Coenen, 2005; Malerba, 2002) shape MNCs’ abilities 
5 
 
to transfer advanced knowledge from one location to another within the firm (Kristensen & 
Morgan, 2007). Similarly, whilst we recognize that MNC entry modes are likely to influence 
the subsidiary’s embeddedness, the firm’s willingness to share authority with key personnel 
abroad, institutional specificities, and access to foreign assets (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & 
Peng, 2009), we do not analyse these here. We do note that acquisitions and joint ventures are 
more likely than greenfield investments to provide an MNC with quicker access to locally 
embedded knowledge (Lam, 2003) . 
The paper’s next section assesses how internal and external embeddedness are related, 
sets out our subsidiary classification, and analyses how the different types of knowledge-
augmenting subsidiary influence MNCs’ requirements to share authority with, and seek to 
gain the commitment of, key subsidiary employees. The subsequent sections discuss how 
institutions influence investments in knowledge-augmenting capabilities, starting with the 
role of the state before examining how institutions shape firms’ abilities to manage different 
levels of internal and external embeddedness. The final section concludes. 
 
Internal and external embeddedness, and the development of knowledge-augmenting 
capabilities: The role of authority sharing and employee commitment 
Several R&D typologies highlight the possibility that internal and external embeddedness are 
sometimes, in a broad sense, inversely related (Kuemmerle, 1999a), arguing that some 
subsidiaries that augment knowledge have high levels of external and low levels of internal 
embeddedness (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; Kuemmerle, 1999a; Sölvell & Zander, 1998), 
leading, in our terminology, to ‘global vanguard subsidiaries’. As other frameworks note, 
subsidiaries can have high levels of internal and external embeddedness (Manolopoulos et al., 
2011), leading to ‘networked’ subsidiaries. 
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Extending existing typologies, we argue that internal and external knowledge-
augmenting embeddedness are independent from one another, enabling us to identify two 
previously overlooked and counter-intuitive types of knowledge-augmenting subsidiary. 
First, some knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries are weakly embedded locally, but are 
strongly embedded within the MNC, leading to ‘parent company outposts’. Second, some 
knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries may be relatively weakly embedded internally and 
externally (Foss & Pedersen, 2001); these ‘free spirits’ are largely self-sufficient and require 
little input from other actors to enhance their capabilities.  
As we argue below, the degree to which multinationals need to share authority with, 
and gain the commitment of, employees in the foreign knowledge-augmenting subsidiary will 
depend on the subsidiary’s levels of internal and external embeddedness to generate valuable 
knowledge. Complementing existing, broader taxonomies, Figure 1 sets out our typology of 
knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries and associated levels of authority sharing and employee 
commitment.  
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Figure 1. Types of knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries, authority sharing, organizational 
careers, and stock options 
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We put this typology forward as a collection of ideal types. Reality will be more 
complex. Actual subsidiaries may carry out a range of knowledge-generating activities, 
leading, potentially, to two subsidiary types within one actual subsidiary (Frost, Birkinshaw, 
& Ensign, 2002); in this situation, we would expect different groups of subsidiary employees 
that carry out distinct activities to exhibit varying degrees of embeddedness, reflecting their 
requirements to interact with local and/or other MNC actors.  
Moreover, a subsidiary’s internal and external knowledge-augmenting embeddedness 
are dynamic (Kristensen, 2016; Morgan & Kristensen, 2006); the parent company may not, 
because of incomplete information and subsidiary opportunism, co-ordinate or fully control a 
subsidiary’s internal or external embeddedness (Morgan & Kristensen, 2006); and power 
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asymmetries and micro-politics within MNCs will moderate how head-office’s strategic 
decisions translate into subsidiary objectives and practices (Becker-Ritterspach & 
Dörrenbächer, 2009).  
By focusing on these distinct subsidiary types, we aim to show how institutions 
influence the existence of different types of subsidiary and firms’ abilities to acquire 
knowledge-augmenting capabilities abroad. Consequently, we highlight the causal 
mechanisms that help to explain patterns of firms’ investments in knowledge-augmenting 
subsidiaries overseas and address the types of subsidiaries that exist holistically. 
Multinationals’ ability to develop knowledge-augmenting capabilities overseas will 
often, but not always, as we will show, depend on host-country managerial, research and 
operational staff being willing and able to contribute to the on-going development and 
creation of knowledge; in general, the more willing employers are to delegate authority to 
overseas employees and to seek to encourage key employees to stay with the firm, the more 
likely those employees are to commit their skills and expertise to the development of the 
firm’s knowledge (Asakawa & Som, 2008; Benton & Magnier-Watanabe, 2012; Harcourt & 
Wood, 2007).  
Authority-sharing is the delegation of discretion to employees over how they perform 
and organize their work so that they are involved in problem-solving activities and contribute 
to the organization’s performance (Whitley, 2005a, p. 236). We extend this definition of 
authority sharing to cover the activities of employers who create, and delegate the resolution 
of, challenging tasks/jobs to employees (to attempt) to recruit and retain highly skilled 
workers (Kristensen & Morgan, 2012, p. 426). Authority sharing can occur outside the firm’s 
boundaries, when a company is embedded within inter-organizational networks, potentially 
enabling actors in the network to learn from one another (Vlaisavljevic, Cabello-Medina, & 
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Pérez-Luño, 2016). Authority sharing, in this sense, will mean that the subsidiary’s managers 
can decide how to respond to, and initiate, change within its host-country network(s).  
 Employers can encourage employees’ commitment and contributions to knowledge 
generation by seeking to tie key employees to the firm. One way to do this is to offer them 
long-term employment and promotion; that is, by establishing organizational careers for at 
least some skilled subsidiary employees (Whitley, 2005a, p. 237). Firms that do not require 
such commitment are unlikely to have such policies (Morgan et al., 2003; Whitley, 2005a). 
Another way to bind key employees to a firm and to gain their commitment to its knowledge-
generating activities, especially when skilled-labour mobility is high, is to provide financial 
incentives, such as stock options (Casper, 2007, p. 53).  
Whilst some combinations of authority sharing and organizational careers are 
feasible, others are less so: authority sharing is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for 
long-term organizational careers, meaning that high levels of authority sharing do not 
automatically imply that some employees will have organizational careers. However, MNCs 
are unlikely to offer long-term careers to subsidiary staff without sharing authority with them 
(Whitley, 2005a, p. 257),  
 Parent company outposts will be run as appendages of the multinational, reflecting 
the subsidiary’s role in accessing a host-country subsidy (Wilson, 2009), testing facilities, 
less restrictive health or environmental regulations (Müller, Fujiwara, & Herstatt, 2004; Witt 
& Lewin, 2007), or lower-cost talent (Manning, Sydow, & Windeler, 2012). Because parent 
company outposts take advantage of an aspect of a host-country’s innovation system that 
does not require the subsidiary to be strongly embedded locally, any local personnel are 
unlikely to have much authority and will probably not have organizational careers or stock 
options. Indeed, strong external embeddedness may result in undesirable knowledge 
spillovers (Lorenzen & Mahnke, 2002), increasing the likelihood that important knowledge 
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and resources, including managers and skilled employees, will come from the rest of the 
multinational.  
Our ‘parent company outposts’ share some characteristics with ‘branch plants’: both 
are weakly embedded locally. However, a typical trait of branch plants is the absence of high-
value added, knowledge-generating activities (Phelps, 2009). Within our framework, we 
expect company outposts, by definition, to conduct such activities, potentially including 
R&D, engineering or product and process innovations.  
An MNC that established a low-cost, knowledge-augmenting engineering centre in 
Romania illustrates this point. As the technical standards of local universities were out-dated, 
the MNC collaborated with one of them to improve the quality of local engineers. Rejecting 
offers from the university to conduct joint R&D projects, the MNC focused solely on training 
to reduce costs by employing lower-cost engineers; thus, the subsidiary’s external 
embeddedness remained limited. Moreover, the subsidiary lacked autonomy and relied on 
knowledge transfers from the MNC (Manning et al., 2012). 
To augment their knowledge, networked subsidiaries need to be able to respond to, 
and initiate, changes within their local and MNC networks, requiring subsidiary staff to have 
some decision-making powers to adapt locally (Gassmann & von Zedtwitz, 1999); however, 
the need to collaborate with other units in the MNC limits the independence of subsidiary 
employees. As Manolopoulos et al.’s (2011) work demonstrates, networked subsidiaries have 
some autonomy, as they are comparatively free to make strategic and operational decisions 
on their own, but do not have complete discretion.  
Global vanguard subsidiaries collaborate primarily with local actors rather than MNC 
units to generate valuable information and are likely to have global product mandates (Sölvell 
& Zander, 1998). Consequently, the rest of the organization is more dependent on the 
subsidiary than vice versa. Subsidiary employees are, therefore, likely to have extensive 
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decision-making powers so that they can respond to, and help to create, changes in their local 
networks, requiring the multinational to retain subsidiary staff and to encourage them to 
contribute to learning within the organization as a whole and, hence, to bind some of them to 
the subsidiary. 
Roche’s recent purchase of Genentech to augment its knowledge based on that 
embodied and embedded within Genentech and its local networks illustrates these arguments. 
Genentech employees have considerable decision-making powers, more generous long-term 
stock options than other Roche employees and some of them have the possibility of an 
organizational career with a few senior Genentech employees becoming Roche executives 
(Jack, 2009a, 2009b). 
Free spirits do not rely much on the rest of the MNC or local organizations to 
enhance their knowledge. They are weakly embedded internally and externally; this does not 
mean, however, that they do not have any ties to the rest of the company or to local 
organizations. However, these ties are limited and do not involve the transfer of important 
knowledge to the subsidiary. By definition, free spirits are likely to operate in highly 
specialized and cutting-edge innovation and knowledge fields, and have very skilled 
employees who can generate important new knowledge either individually or in relatively 
small groups, hindering other actors’ abilities to understand at a fundamental level what those 
employees do, and why and how they do it. Consequently, subsidiary employees are likely to 
have much autonomy and financial incentives, but may not have organizational careers.  
Google’s acquisitions of Oxford-based artificial-intelligence (AI) companies, such as 
DeepMind, exemplify free spirit subsidiaries. The number of AI experts is low, perhaps only 
50 worldwide (Regalado, 2014), making the formation of global and local networks to a large 
number of diverse actors difficult. This situation may not last very long: using links to Oxford 
University, DeepMind aims to enhance the number of AI specialists (Ahmed, 2014). 
12 
 
Google’s AI subsidiaries have decision-making powers: DeepMind employees can determine 
the use of some of Google’s other employees and resources (Ahmed, 2014; Regalado, 2014). 
Indeed, DeepMind rather than Google was behind the establishment of an ethics board to 
regulate how Google, as a whole, will use AI (Inofuentes, 2014; Simonite, 2015, p. 18), 
indicating that the subsidiary has important discretionary powers.  
 
Institutions and firms’ investments in knowledge-augmenting capabilities abroad  
Figure 2 presents our holistic framework to explain patterns of investment both in and out of 
countries to gain access to knowledge-augmenting capabilities. It shows how host-country 
states influence the ability of foreign firms to acquire key resources, which those 
governments are likely to have helped to create, as well as the moderating role of institutions 
on firms’ abilities to invest in knowledge-augmenting assets overseas and to manage different 
types of knowledge-enhancing subsidiary. In the following sections, we draw on the 
comparative capitalisms literature to examine how institutions influence firms’ abilities to 
invest in knowledge-augmenting assets overseas. 
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Figure 2. Institutions and patterns of investment in different types of knowledge-augmenting subsidiary 
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The state and foreign companies’ access to host-country knowledge-augmenting assets 
This section focuses on the host-country state as state support to encourage the growth of 
particular sectors or companies is often important, varies between countries (Hong, Wang, & 
Kafouros, 2015) and influences their willingness to accept the presence of foreign companies 
that seek to gain from those investments (U.S. Department of State, 2015).  
Numerous typologies exist to capture the state’s variable involvement in economic 
activity, including ‘predatory’ states (Carney & Witt, 2014), ‘state’ and ‘managed’ 
capitalisms (Schmidt, 2002), and ‘segmented business systems’ (Wood & Frynas, 2006). 
Drawing on Whitley’s (2005b) typology, we distinguish between ‘arm’s length’, ‘dominant-
developmental’, ‘business-corporatist’ and ‘inclusive-corporatist’ states to highlight 
fundamental differences between government involvement in economic development and 
their implications for authority sharing and employee commitment. However, any particular 
state’s role in the economy is not uniform; it is often sector specific, resulting in 1) some 
arm’s length states that seek to promote and protect industries that are ‘strategically 
important’ (Wade, 2012) or have national-security implications and 2) some developmental 
states that encourage foreign firms’ investments to stimulate domestic development in some 
industries (Thurbon & Weiss, 2006). 
Arm’s length states, as an ideal type, set regulations that create a ‘level playing field’ 
for all companies and they do not intervene directly in firm activities. Dominant-
developmental states, by contrast, adopt a proactive, strategic approach and seek to promote 
particular firms or sectors by providing financial aid, creating incentives for firms to invest in 
favoured technologies or markets and using public money to enhance firms’ competitiveness 
(Allen & Allen, 2015; Whitley, 2005b). ‘Business’ and ‘inclusive corporatist’ states play a 
considerable role in economic development, but, unlike arm’s length and dominant-
developmental states, tolerate the existence of independent intermediary organizations to 
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represent different groups’ interests in policy decisions and implementation (Whitley, 2005b). 
Whilst business corporatist states work with associations that represent large companies, 
inclusive-corporatist ones rely on business and union associations to achieve policy 
objectives (Allen & Allen, 2015; Whitley, 2005b). 
Developmental states are likely to tolerate foreign companies tapping into publicly 
funded schemes to generate knowledge in key sectors only if domestic firms can learn from 
foreign-owned subsidiaries as part of a local network (Morgan, 2016; Thurbon & Weiss, 
2016; U.S. Department of State, 2015), as China (Child & Marinova, 2014; U.S. Department 
of State, 2015), South Korea and Taiwan (Carney & Witt, 2014) demonstrate. Developmental 
states differ in their treatment of varying types of foreign investment between themselves and 
over time. Taiwan has, for instance, sometimes had more restrictive policies on greenfield 
investment and joint ventures than South Korea, which softened its stance on foreign 
investment in 1998 to stabilize the chaebols and then limited inward FDI once they had 
recovered (Thurbon & Weiss, 2006). 
Even when arm’s length states seek to promote particular sectors, they are likely to 
accept investment into more types of knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries than their 
developmental and corporatist counterparts. For instance, the US government has provided 
financial and technical assistance to firms, including foreign ones (Lange, 2009), in the 
biotechnology, defence and information technology sectors (Keller & Block, 2013, 2015). 
However, the U.S. government has blocked some foreign companies’ proposed investments. 
It typically does so if the overseas firm comes from a dominant-developmental state 
(Sauvant, 2009); is state owned or has close links to its home government, as many Chinese 
multinationals do (Wu, Hoon, & Yuzhu, 2011); and/or is in a security-related sector, such as 
ICT (Sauvant, 2009). The U.S. example also illustrates the interplay between inward 
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investment and home-country institutions: the impact of regulations varies depending on the 
potential investor’s home country. 
We expect the willingness of business-corporatist and inclusive-corporatist states to 
accept foreign companies’ investments in knowledge-augmenting resources to be between 
arm’s length states and dominant-developmental states. For instance, the German government 
did not prevent foreign firms acquiring some German solar photovoltaic (PV) companies, 
despite state funding to support cutting-edge solar PV technologies and some firms (Allen & 
Allen, 2015); however, it has blocked the sale of other companies on security grounds (DW, 
2016).  
 
Home-country institutions and the relationship between internal and external 
embeddedness 
Institutions do not exist ‘outside’ actors; they also ‘reach down into’ actors to shape their 
interests and preferences (Morgan & Kristensen, 2006). Specifically, home-country 
institutions that relate to the ownership and control of companies will influence the types of 
firms that exist, their priorities, the interconnections between them and, consequently, the 
types of routines, organizational capabilities and strategies that they are likely to implement 
and pursue successfully (Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Hong et al., 2015; Khanna, Palepu, & 
Sinha, 2005).  
Institutions do not, though, determine firms’ strategies (Allen, Liu, Allen, & Saqib, 
n.d.; Lange, 2009); actors are able to learn and experiment within existing institutional 
frameworks (Kristensen & Morgan, 2012; Morgan, 2016), leading to a bounded range of 
outcomes within any particular institutional context (Lange, Geppert, Saka-Helmhout, & 
Becker-Ritterspach, 2015; Wood, Croucher, Brewster, Collings, & Brookes, 2009). For 
instance, Denmark’s ‘flexicurity’ system has constrained and enabled actors’ responses to 
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economic challenges (Kristensen & Morgan, 2012). Unions and workers have been able to 
use local institutional resources creatively and experimentally to increase the prevalence and 
quality of firm-level training. Whilst national-level institutions constrained these changes, 
they transformed some workers’ skills, enhancing the availability of particular types of 
knowledge (Kristensen & Morgan, 2012). Moreover, any particular firm’s institutional 
specificities are likely to be dynamic and differ from national ideal typical ones as a result of 
cultural, occupational, sub-national and sectoral variations (Allen, 2013; Kristensen & 
Morgan, 2012). 
Any particular firm’s dynamic, contested and spatially specific home-country 
institutional setting will, therefore, shape, but not determine, that firm’s ability to share 
authority with host-country organizations and employees in knowledge-augmenting 
subsidiaries and to use certain HR policies, such as organizational careers and financial 
incentives (Brewster et al., 2015; Su, Peng, & Xie, 2016). Consequently, companies’ abilities 
to establish and manage different types of knowledge-augmenting subsidiary will vary 
(Whitley, 2005a). Institutions are not the sole influence on firms: the nature of the knowledge 
that the multinational seeks to generate will influence subsidiary embeddedness and, hence, 
the MNCs’ abilities to develop such subsidiaries, too (Asheim & Coenen, 2005; Sölvell & 
Zander, 1998).  
Building on Whitley (2001, 2005b, 2012), we anticipate that, in general, companies 
from arm’s length institutional settings, such as the UK and US, are more likely to invest in 
knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries overseas than are those from business corporatist 
regimes, such as Japan, or inclusive corporatist states, such as Germany. As firms in arm’s 
length institutional regimes largely develop competitive competencies in isolation from other 
organizations and do not rely on the majority of their employees to contribute to the 
development of their capabilities (Allen, 2013; Brewster et al., 2015), they must manage risks 
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by themselves, increasing the likelihood that they will invest in new opportunities overseas 
(Whitley, 2005a). Moreover, their relative isolation means that they are comparatively free 
from employee and business partner constraints, enhancing their ability to invest abroad 
(Whitley, 2005a, 2012).  
 In business-corporatist regimes, the government’s influence over the strategies of 
large domestic firms and the role of business associations in reducing opportunism will 
enable those firms to share some authority with skilled domestic employees and offer them 
organizational careers; in addition, state support and influential business associations can 
facilitate links between large firms (Whitley, 2007). Consequently, the contributions of 
home-country employees and other organizations to the competitive strengths of firms from 
business-corporatist environments will constrain their abilities to invest in knowledge-
augmenting capabilities overseas (Whitley, 2005a, 2012).  
Inclusive-corporatist environments provide support to firms to share authority with, 
and offer organizational careers to, a considerable number of home-country employees 
(Brewster et al., 2015; Harcourt & Wood, 2007); moreover, they enable greater inter-
organizational risk and information sharing (Whitley, 2005b, 2012). Therefore, such firms’ 
organizational capabilities are likely to be embedded in particular relationships with domestic 
business partners and a broad range of home-country employees, restricting firms’ abilities to 
establish relationships with new employees and business partners in foreign knowledge-
augmenting subsidiaries, as any new ties may jeopardize existing home-country ones (Lane, 
1998; Whitley, 2001, p. 47, 2005a, p. 249). For instance, employee representatives in 
inclusive-corporatist systems are often powerful and may (seek to) block investments in 
knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries abroad that are relatively independent from the MNC’s 
headquarters (Fritsch, 2015; Whitley, 2012, pp. 222–223).  
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Firms from dominant-developmental environments are likely to mimic the state’s 
centralization of authority, restricting the delegation of decision-making powers to lower-
level employees and providing organizational careers to a small number of senior home-
country managers. Dominant-developmental states are likely to favour large firms over small 
ones, and competition for state privileges will limit co-operation between large companies, 
unless the state advocates specific inter-firm alliances (Whitley, 2005b). Therefore, 
companies from dominant-developmental states are likely to develop their competitive 
strengths in isolation from one another and most employees (Wang, Bruning, & Peng, 2007; 
Whitley, 2005b).  
Consequently, such companies are largely free from business-partner and employee 
constraints, increasing their ability to invest in knowledge-augmenting capabilities overseas; 
however, the home-country state is likely to directly and indirectly influence firm investment 
decisions, leading to patterns of investment that reflect political as well as commercial 
objectives, as China illustrates (Hong et al., 2015). 
Although firms from arm’s-length institutional systems are likely to invest more in 
knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries abroad than companies from other institutional settings, 
the latter firms will still invest significant amounts (Lehrer, Asakawa, & Behnam, 2011; 
Sauvant, 2009). Indeed, firms from all institutional systems may engage in ‘institutional 
arbitrage’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001): arm’s length systems tend to support radical innovations 
(Hotho, 2014), encouraging some firms from corporatist institutional systems to locate 
knowledge-generating activities related to radical innovation there (Morgan et al., 2003; 
Whitley, 2005a); conversely, firms from arm’s length systems may locate knowledge-
generating activities related to incremental innovation in inclusive-corporatist institutional 
systems (Matten & Geppert, 2004).  
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Similarly, firms may invest abroad to ‘escape’ home-country institutional constraints 
(Fuller, 2016; Witt & Lewin, 2007). For knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries, these ‘escape 
responses’ are likely to occur when the home-country regulatory environment restricts 
particular knowledge-generating activities and be more relevant for corporatist systems than 
arm’s length ones (Witt & Lewin, 2007). For instance, several German pharmaceutical firms 
invested in the U.S. in the 1980s to ‘escape’ Germany’s restrictive institutional environment 
for biotechnology research (Lehrer et al., 2011).  
 
Home- and host-country institutions and different types of knowledge-augmenting 
subsidiary 
We anticipate some variation in the types of knowledge-augmenting subsidiary that firms 
from different institutional regimes invest in. For instance, ‘parent company outposts’ are 
likely to be the most unproblematic type of subsidiary for firms from all types of institutional 
regime because of their low external embeddedness. By contrast, ‘networked’ subsidiaries are 
likely to pose greater problems to MNCs from corporatist regimes compared to arm’s length 
ones, because of their high external embeddedness (Fritsch, 2015; Manning et al., 2012). For 
example, some Japanese and U.S. pharmaceutical and ICT companies invested in the U.K. to 
extend their knowledge; to function effectively, these facilities needed to run as networked 
subsidiaries with key subsidiary employees in these subsidiaries having some decision-
making powers and the possibility of an organizational career (Lam, 2003). However, home-
country institutions, such as strong internal labour markets, restricted the Japanese firms’ 
ability to meet these requirements, limiting the success of the Japanese firms’ investment 
compared to that of their U.S. counterparts. The Japanese state influenced these institutions: 
low public funding of basic research and limited incentives for academia to collaborate with 
industry reinforced the importance of internal labour markets and ‘the insular nature of the 
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human resource system in R&D [in Japan]’ (Lam, 2003: 681). Global vanguard subsidiaries 
and free spirits are likely to pose even more challenges to firms from corporatist systems as 
home-country actors may prevent the subsidiary from having the substantive autonomy that it 
requires to function effectively (Fritsch, 2015, p. 151; Manning et al., 2012).  
We expect firms from arm’s-length institutional systems to be less focused on a 
particular type of knowledge-augmenting subsidiary, due to employee representatives’ 
limited power and stronger market for corporate control (Lam, 2003; Whitley, 2012). 
Similarly, business partners and employees are unlikely to constrain the abilities of firms 
from dominant-developmental states to invest in different types of knowledge-augmenting 
capabilities abroad; states, both at home and abroad, are, however, likely to be important 
influences on their investments. 
 
Conclusion 
Complementing and extending existing typologies of foreign R&D subsidiaries, we have 
developed a novel typology of increasingly important knowledge-generating subsidiaries and 
have identified new groups of subsidiaries. The ‘free spirit’ and ‘parent company outposts’ 
categories of subsidiary highlight a broader range of subsidiary types than existing 
taxonomies recognize.  
 This typology has important policy implications. For example, parent-company 
outposts draw on host-country policies and subsidies, but they have few, if any, substantive 
links to local organizations, limiting domestic firms’ and workers’ opportunities to learn from 
foreign companies and reducing host-economy benefits (cf. Kuemmerle, 1999b). This 
problem is likely to be greater in arm’s length states than dominant-developmental ones, as 
the former will not scrutinize inward investment as much as the latter and the former are 
likely to have fewer restrictions on foreign companies establishing separate legal entities in 
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their jurisdictions. To increase parent-company outposts’ embeddedness, host-country 
governments could increase the conditionality associated with foreign MNCs’ use of 
infrastructure or eligibility for subsidies. Furthermore, governments could implement sector- 
and region-specific policies to co-ordinate and increase the benefits of public-sector and 
foreign and domestic firms’ investments (Phelps, 2009).  
Free spirits pose different challenges: host-country governments should devise ways 
to encourage their growth and seek to embed them in the local knowledge-generating system. 
For instance, government programmes in arm’s length settings to support small businesses, 
which free spirits are likely to be, can help 1) scientists, technologists, and engineers start 
their own companies, 2) private-sector organizations identify suitable investments and 3) 
small firms gain access to public-procurement schemes; all of which aid network formation 
(Keller & Block, 2013). For networked and global vanguard subsidiaries, the host-country 
government should seek to ensure their continued success and develop an understanding of 
the factors that promoted that success. These factors could include research institutes, firms, 
financial systems and local labour-market institutions. 
We have assessed how institutions shape firm characteristics, behaviour and their 
ability to develop knowledge in different locations. Whilst we expect firms from similar 
institutional settings to share some characteristics, any individual company is unique and, 
hence, within any specific institutional system, firms are diverse (Hotho & Saka-Helmhout, 
n.d.; Lane & Wood, 2009). Therefore, firms’ mechanisms and capabilities to identify, 
generate and absorb advanced knowledge will vary; furthermore, the range of innovation 
possibilities that any particular firm’s researchers, technologists and managers foresee will 
differ and be company specific (Metcalfe, 1995). Consequently, institutions do not determine 
the diversity and prevalence of MNCs’ knowledge-augmenting subsidiaries, but do delimit 
possible outcomes (Kristensen & Morgan, 2012). Employee representatives’ powerful role in 
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corporatist systems, for instance, makes the establishment of global vanguard subsidiaries 
less likely.  
Firm specificities also include their finite resources and existing social ties. Three 
important points follow from this. First, as external and internal embeddedness require firms 
to identify, develop and manage potentially useful inter- and intra-organizational 
relationships, companies’ limited resources mean they have to decide which other 
organizations and/or parts of the MNC (not) to connect to. Second, managers’ social and 
financial investments in existing linkages may make them reluctant to severe those ties, 
potentially resulting in the continuation of some relationships that do not augment the firm’s 
knowledge. Third, managers’ incomplete information about the benefits of establishing new 
subsidiaries as well as existing subsidiaries’ activities will influence investment decisions. 
Together, these points indicate that existing and new relationships within and between firms 
are not necessarily ‘optimal’; they do not inevitably maximize firms’ knowledge-generating 
capabilities, but will shape the diversity and prevalence of MNCs’ knowledge-augmenting 
subsidiaries.  
Furthermore, by highlighting the diversity of firms that seek to invest in knowledge-
augmenting capabilities abroad, we draw attention to the interplay between inward 
investment and institutions. In particular, the rise of Chinese MNCs has led to greater 
scrutiny of foreign investors who wish to acquire U.S. companies (Sauvant, 2009; Wu et al., 
2011). Whilst the U.S. illustrates how this interaction may reduce the availability of 
knowledge-augmenting resources to some foreign investors, other examples demonstrate how 
the interaction between foreign investors and the institutions around knowledge-augmenting 
resources can increase the availability of those resources over time (Asakawa & Som, 2008). 
Our focus helps to explain how institutions shape patterns of inward and outward 
investment in knowledge-augmenting facilities, highlighting the host-country state’s role in 
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allowing foreign firms to invest there to benefit from knowledge-generating resources. In 
general, developmental states are likely to be more reluctant to countenance such investments 
than regulatory states are. We also showed how home-country institutions are likely to shape, 
inter alia, MNCs’ authority sharing with host-country employees. We, therefore, extend 
existing typologies that tend to assume that 1) multinationals can acquire or establish foreign 
firms with those capabilities easily and 2) all firms are equally able to share authority with 
host-country employees and business partners, and gain the commitment of key foreign-
workers to knowledge-augmenting activities. We, therefore, supplement existing 
classifications to offer a theory that seeks to explain the prevalence of different types of 
knowledge-augmenting subsidiary abroad as well as the kinds of firm that are likely to invest 
in them, aiding our understanding of a group of subsidiaries that is becoming increasingly 
important and politically salient and highlighting future research areas.  
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